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1. Introduction
In 1989, communism collapsed in Central and Eastern Europę. For 
many this came as a surprise, as the communist regimes, then referred 
to as the ‘Soviet bloc’, were well known for their high degree of stability. 
Unlike any other group of politicians in post-war Europę, the communists 
had a proven capacity to maintain their power in the political arena [Bide- 
leux and Jeffries, 1998].
Scholars of economics and political science were also taken by surprise. 
Therefore, the idea of the inevitable collapse of the system of central 
planning had to be conceived of as an ex post rationalization. With the 
benefit of hindsight it has not been very difficult to expose the system’s 
weak points, but though the economic backwardness vis-a-vis the West 
was evident from the 1970s, there were no elear grounds to believe that 
the perceived ‘muddling through’ could not be perpetuated [Lavigne, 1999, 
91], Moreover, the debates about socialism from the 1920s onwards had 
been endowed with Pareto’s ‘indifference theorem’. According to this theo- 
rem, it is impossible to theoretically establish the superiority of market 
co-ordination over central planning. It is even doubtful whether it is 
possible to distinguish between the two economic orders with the tools of 
mainstream economic theory [Van Ees and Garretsen, 1994, 3].
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With the fali of the Iron Curtain, the supremacy of market co-ordination 
was apparently confirmed and the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy became a primary ąuestion for political 
economists. Some scholars have even coined the term ‘transitology’ as the 
title of a new discipline within economics and political science [cf. Bónker, 
et al., 2002], This raises two ąuestions: firstly, what might the alleged 
research domain of this new discipline be, and secondly, what tools are 
available for applying transitology?
This article addresses some of these issues with regard to the ontology 
and epistemology of social economic research on the transition in Central 
and Eastern Europę. The concept of transition is delineated in the follow- 
ing section and the extent to which it is conceivabłe to identify a group 
of transition countries is discussed. Literaturę on this topie reveals that 
the transition to a fully fledged market economy is restricted to countries 
with a socialist past. Thus, the issues of this section are intertwined with 
the crumbling of communism at the end of the 1980s.
Another common characteristic of transition countries is that, during 
the first steps towards market co-ordination, these States were confronted 
with a sharp and unprecedented decline in economic activity. The succes- 
sive section scrutinizes the causes and severity of this “transition” crisis, 
as these elements dominated the ‘shock-versus-gradualism debate’ at the 
beginning of the scholarly discussion on the subject of transition.
Even in the case of consensus about the optimal itinerary for imple- 
menting a market economy, the ąuestion ‘is it possible to follow the plan?’ 
remains. A recurrent theme in the debates on transition is the intertwin- 
ing of market reform and democratization. The section ‘dual transitions’ 
thus examines the extent to which the latter facilitates or obstructs the 
former.
Perceptions of the transition crisis and of dual transitions of market 
reform and democratization have evolved in due course and these de- 
velopments are reflected in the theoretical underpinnings of the notion 
of transition. Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s stabilization and 
liberalization dominated the agenda of transition theory and became 
a generally accepted approach - much to the detriment of regional studies 
- the second half of the 1990s showed a resurgence of studies focusing on 
the implementation of and compliance with the rules of the market gamę. 
This development led to a revival of concern for the specific naturę of the 
transition in Central and Eastern Europę and the need for an interdisci- 
plinary approach. This evolution of transitology is discussed in the section 
‘path-dependent transitology’.
The paper concludes by focusing on the ąuestion, ‘When is transition 
over?’
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2. Transition - the beginning
The phrase ‘transition to a market economy’ seems to be restricted 
to the countries that belonged to the Soviet bloc. While many countries 
are striving to implement a market economy, including less developed 
countries, transition focuses on a designed and co-ordinated shift from 
a communist to a capitalist order. This fact obliges us to look at the de- 
cay of communism and the climate of rivalry between the co-ordinating 
mechanisms of the two systems.
When visiting the United States in 1959, Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- 
chev used the words ‘we will bury you’ to signify the competition between 
the two world-leading co-ordination systems and to designate the obvious 
winner. Thirty years later, the opposite of this prophecy became a reality. 
Western advisors were travelling eastwards to Warsaw, Budapest, Mos- 
cow and other capitals in Central and Eastern Europę to help govern- 
ments bury communism and build a democratic capitalist order on the 
legacy of central planning and dictatorship.
For some scholars the decline of communism in Central and Eastern 
Europę was an inevitable event [Balcerowicz, 1995], but it is important 
to underline the fact that the majority of scholars in the field of compara- 
tive economic studies were certainly not convinced that the inbuilt flaws 
of communism would lead to a collapse. The system was simply reality 
- ‘real existing socialism’ - and in the post-war era it had shown impres- 
sive growth performances [Bergson, 1978; Ofer, 1987], Stagnation sińce 
the 1970s [Schroeder, 1975] did not herald the end of the system. Its 
world-weariness throughout the Brezhnev era was at best a motive to 
reform, not to transform, co-ordinating devices.
Sustainable reforms of the system of central planning took place spe- 
cifically in Hungary and Poland. In 1968, Hungary introduced a compre- 
hensive reform package, the so-called ‘New Economic Mechanism’. The 
intention was to revise the system of mandatory planning and change 
it into a mechanism of indicative planning. A partial decentralization of 
prices took place and managers were given broader responsibilities with 
respect to what, how many, and for whom to produce [Lavigne, 1999].1 In
1 The concept of ‘market socialism’ falls outside the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it 
makes sense to consider the extent to which Hungarian and Polish economic reforms were 
based upon this model. Usually, the idea of market socialism has been defined with Oskar 
Lange’s idea of the auctioneer in mind [Lange, 1936], Using this definition, the reforms 
in Hungary and Poland cannot be conceived of as market socialism. In the Lange model 
there are decentralized production decisions under centralized price decisions, whereas in 
Hungary and in Poland the intention was to decentralize both.
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the 1980s, subseąuent to the chaos that arose due to the strikes organized 
by ‘Solidarity’, the Polish government successively introduced elements of 
a market economy. As in Hungary, there was a decisive decentralization 
of prices and production.
The economic reforms in Hungary and Poland did not lead to an en- 
during enhancement of growth, although the supply of consumer goods 
in Hungary did improve. The problems were twofold. Firstly, a system 
emerged in which bargaining played an even greater role than before. 
Whereas under mandatory planning output was the primary stake for 
bargaining, under the system known as ‘plan bargaining’ in the Hungar- 
ian and Polish modę of indicative planning, the indicators were developed 
under the system known as ‘regulator bargaining’. While the allocation 
mechanism became morę intricate, the supply constraints remained. 
Moreover, there was a diffuse system of property rights. Managers were 
authorized to make decisions about levels of production, but ultimately 
they were not held responsible for the conseąuences of their decisions 
[Kornai, 1980],
Secondly, reforms were restricted to parts of the economy. They did 
not affect companies that produced and delivered commodities to coun- 
tries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 
for example.2 Also, competition was partial and the furtive behaviour of 
managers rendered the reforms inconsistent [Lavigne, 1999].
2 The CMEA was created in January 1947 as Stalin’s response to the Marshall Plan. 
In addition to the Soviet Union, the founding countries were Bułgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. Albania and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
joined in 1949 and 1950, respectively. Though Albania never officially resigned, it no longer 
participated after 1961. The non-European countries in the CMEA were Mongolia (1962), 
Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978). In 1991, the organization, designed to promote economic 
co-operation among socialist countries, was dissolved [Bideleux and Jeffries, 1998].
The reforms in Hungary and Poland were economic not political. In this 
respect, several authors have drawn attention to a ‘social contract’ be- 
tween the political authorities and the citizens. The population was prom- 
ised greater prosperity as a reward for not demanding political reforms 
[Bideleux and Jeffries, 1998, 564 ff.]. This was due, in the 1960s, to the 
Hungarian leader Janos Kadar’s determination to prevent a recurrence 
of the events of 1956. Similar considerations played a role for the Polish 
statesman Wojciech Jaruzelski during martial law in the 1980s.
When economic and political reforms coincided, for example during 
the Prague Spring, the position of the communist rulers was morę en- 
dangered. For these leaders, the tide of reform could only be stemmed 
by using the threat or actual use of military force. It was the coinci-
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dence of economic and political reforms rather than just poor economic 
performance that threatened the endurance of the system. The system 
of enlightened communism did not really outperform the unreformed 
co-ordination mechanisms of central planning and it had been evident 
sińce the 1970s that they were falling behind the West. Differences in 
performance between the two reformist regimes did not threaten the 
existence of communism, which still existed and sustained itself. How- 
ever, the combination of economic reform - ‘perestroika’ - and political 
openness - ‘glasnost’ - initiated by Michaił Gorbachev in 1986, began an 
irreversible process.
It remains a matter of debate as to whether the events in 1989, which 
triggered the collapse of communism, also implied the demise of social- 
ism, or rather entailed the end of a particular modę of socialism - Soviet 
planning [Carson, 1991]. On the basis of this distinction, the concept of 
transition is restricted to the creation of a market economy, embedded in 
a democratic order built on the legacy of an autocratic system with central 
planning. This domain distinguishes transition countries from, on the one 
hand, developing countries that lack fast and sustainable modernization 
and growth and, on the other hand, highly developed countries that have 
experienced high growth.
After the fali of communism, the number of publications dealing with 
transition grew rapidly. Many publishers of scientific books and journals 
arranged special series on the topie. The transition series were not so 
much filled with contributions by regional specialists and scholars, who 
until 1989 had worked in the field of comparative economic studies, but 
rather with the work of scholars who had never revealed any particular 
interest in Central and Eastern Europę [Csaba, 1993]. For many econo- 
mists, the transition dilemma had created an excellent opportunity for 
applying empirical research that had been obsolete, if applicable at all.
3. Transition - the crisis
The transition from a supply-constrained system to a demand-con- 
strained system entailed, firstly, ending both the ąueuing caused by ra- 
tioning and the policy of forced savings. Therefore, this transition was 
primarily conceived of as a ąuestion of stabilization and liberalization 
[Bruno, 1992], Stabilization implied the enforcement of restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policies. At the same time, the liberalization of prices, pro- 
duction, and trade was envisaged as a necessary precondition for a market 
economy. There was also specific focus on the price of a currency, known 
as the exchange ratę regime [Lavigne, 1999],
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The discussion of stabilization and liberalization was a constituent part 
of the so-called ‘shock-versus-gradualism’ debate. At stake in this debate 
was the ąuestion of how to minimise transition costs. The pace and se- 
ąuence of the implementation of the necessary reforms were considered 
instrumental in determining costs. Adherents of the shock approach em- 
phasized the importance of the simultaneous implementation of all the 
reforms at fuli speed, rather than a seąuential implementation [Aslund, 
2002], Those in favour of a gradual shift stressed the importance of se­
ąuential implementation and were very doubtful of the benefits of rapid 
implementation of reforms [Murrell, 1992; 1995].
Though the debate was not solely confined to stabilization and liberali­
zation, it also included the speed and seąuencing of the microeconomic 
restructuring of production and market rules, the labelling of the strate- 
gies instituted in transition countries was usually based on the concepts 
of stabilization and liberalization [Hoen, 1996]. At the beginning of the 
1990s, Hungary was conceived of as a transition country that relied upon 
a gradual shift towards a market economy, building on the reforms of 
the 1970s and 1980s rather than rejecting them. In contrast, Poland was 
believed to be a textbook example of shock treatment. However, consider- 
ing the issues of privatization and institution building, there were strong 
grounds to change these conceptions.
The stabilization and liberalization of the economies in Central and 
Eastern Europę were accompanied by an unprecedented decline in eco- 
nomic activity. It was not only the successor States of the Soviet Union 
that faced a deep transition crisis, but also the countries on the borders 
of the European Union (EU) which, for reasons of their location, were in 
a better position to create export-generated growth. Table 1 illustrates 
the transition crisis.
The decline in economic activity, measured in real changes of gross 
domestic product (GDP), was morę severe and protracted than foreseen 
and its damaging effects even surpassed those of the Great Depression 
of the 1930s [Poznański, 2002, 61]. A decade after the start of transition, 
only a few transition countries had been able to reach and exceed the GDP 
levels of 1989: Albania, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The States that 
emerged from the Soviet Union were particularly harshly hit. In some 
cases there was a cumulative decline amounting to 50% of GDP in a time 
span of just a few years.
Undoubtedly, the use of 1989 as a yardstick is open to discussion. Be- 
sides problems regarding the GDP index - Poland was already suffering 
from a severe crisis in 1989 - there was also the problem of the incompat- 
ibility of registering output in planned and market economies [Lavigne, 
1999], These measures are not fully reconcilable, although there have
Table 1. Annual Real Growth of Gross Domestic Product, 1990-2004 (percentages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Central and Eastern Europę
Albania -10.3 -27.7 -9.7 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7.0 8.0 7.3 7.8 6.9 5.0 6.0 5.9
Bułgaria -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5 2.4 5.8 4.3 4.8 4.3 5.5
Czech Republic -0.4 -14.2 -6.4 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.8 -1.0 -2.2 -0.8 3.1 3.5 1.5 2.9 4.0
Estonia -8.1 -11.7 -14.2 -8.8 -2.0 4.6 4.0 10.4 5.0 -0.7 6.9 4.3 4.4 4.4 5.8
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3.0 -0.6 -0.2 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 4.4 3.2 2.9 4.0
Latvia 2.9 -8.3 -35.8 -14.3 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.9 1.1 6.6 6.5 4.5 7.0 8.5
Lithuania -5.0 -13.1 -37.7 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -3.9 3.9 4.0 6.7 7.5 6.7
Poland -11.6 -7.6 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 2.2 1.3 3.7 5.3
Romania -5.6 -12.9 -10.0 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -5.4 -3.2 1.6 4.0 4.5 4.9 8.3
Slovakia -0.4 -14.5 -7.0 -3.7 4.9 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 2.2 2.9 4.1 4.0 5.5
Slovenia -4.7 -8.1 -5.4 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 2.2 3.1 2.2 4.6
Commonwealth of Independent States
Armenia -7.4 -10.8 -52.4 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2 3.3 5.7 6.2 12.7 13.9 10.1
Azerbaijan -11.7 -0.7 -22.1 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0 7.4 11.1 7.7 6.1 9.9 10.0
Belarus -3.0 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 2.5 4.2 6.8 11.0
Georgia -12.4 -13.8 -40.3 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 10.8 2.9 3.0 1.9 2.7 4.0 8.6 8.4
Kazakhstan -0.4 -13.5 -13.0 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.2 9.4
Kyrgyzstan 3.5 -5.1 -25.3 -16.0 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.1 4.6 -0.5 6.7 7.1
Russia -4.0 -13.5 -19.0 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 0.9 -4.9 5.4 8.3 5.5 4.2 7.3 7.1
Tajikistan -1.6 -7.1 -28.9 -11.0 -18.9 -12.5 -4.4 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 6.0 4.9 10.2 10.6
Turkmenistan 2.0 -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11.3 5.0 16.0 17.6 9.8 6.1 17.0 7.2
Ukrainę -3.2 -12.6 -17.8 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.8 6.8 4.1 8.5 12.1
Uzbekistan 1.6 -0.5 -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 2.5 4.4 4.1 3.6 2.7 2.9 3.5. 6.0
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been attempts to convert ‘net materiał product’ into GDP [Marer, 1985; 
1992],
The issue of the incompatibility of these methods of registering output 
is reflected in three different views on the harshness of the transition 
crisis which exist in the shock-versus-gradualism debate. Firstly, there 
is the view that, while the crisis may have entailed hardship, the fali in 
production has been nominally overestimated. Centrally planned econo- 
mies were characterized by the registration of outputs that did not exist. 
The phenomenon of a ‘phantom’ economy was not just the result of lies 
arising because higher production was rewarded with a bonus, but was 
also due to greater or lesser degrees of honesty. Hidden changes in the 
output structure were often reported as growth, whereas they actually 
entailed a price increase [Winiecki, 1995]. With the transition to a market 
economy, in which the prevailing tax system may serve as an incentive 
to under-report production, a nominał overestimation of the crisis was 
inevitable.
Secondly, the view was put forward that although the transition crisis 
may have been deep, this was unavoidable. This point of view also relied 
upon differences within the systems. It was not so much the registration 
of non-existent output as the production of unwanted if not obsolete out­
put that was considered to be the major cause of the crisis. A centrally 
planned economy used its resources lavishly and supplied commodities for 
which, under the conditions of a market economy, there was no demand. 
Therefore, the transition to a market economy coincided with a fali in 
demand for these products. Furthermore, available stocks first had to di- 
minish before new production could start. In centrally planned economies 
stocks were not costed and, due to supply constraints, were stockpiled on 
the largest scalę possible. Therefore, depleting old stock took longer than 
envisaged, further delaying the process of transition [Kornai, 1980],
The third view on the transition crisis expressed severe criticism of the 
sharp and protracted naturę of the decline in economic activity. However, 
this perspective also ultimately relied upon the differences between the 
systems. In a market environment, radical stabilization and liberalization 
may effect a relatively quick fali in production, but in a situation in which 
market rules are not yet operational recovery will fail to occur. According 
to this view, the right policy measures were applied to the wrong system 
and, therefore, production that could have been viable after restructuring 
had disappeared [Murrell, 1995]. This analysis was based on a seąuencing 
argument: first markets, then liberalization. Furthermore, according to 
this view the argument for the stimulation of aggregate demand pre- 
vailed. The Keynesian-inspired theory of the ‘credit crunch’ was Most 
commonly referred to in this respect [Calvo and Coricelli, 1993; Coricelli,
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1998], This suggested that high interest rates discouraged private eco- 
nomic activity, whereas State companies remained in a position to rely 
on inter-enterprise debts.
Certainly, at the beginning of the 1990s, advocates of gradual transi- 
tion faced tough resistance and an uphill battle. Backed by neo-classical 
concepts of economics, the necessity of shock treatment appeared to have 
a firm grounding. To further underline these arguments, the proponents 
were able to focus on the sustainability of recovery, although it remained 
a matter of dispute as to what extent this sustainability was to be ascribed 
to policy or legacy [Havrylyshyn et al., 2001]. In addition, the concept of 
‘gradualism’ came under pressure, sińce it was conceived of as a purely 
academic justification of the arguments. Even if there were sound argu­
ments to lower transition costs by postponing certain elements of reform, 
for practical reasons it was still valid to implement them ąuickly. The 
political feasibility of painful economic reforms played a crucial role, with 
the underlying idea being ‘Do what you can do!’
4. Dual transitions
The focus in the dispute, on feasibility rather than on optimality, 
stemmed from the fact that after 1989 the tasks to be faced were those 
arising from a dual transition involving both market reform and democ- 
ratization. In the period immediately following the system’s downfall, 
the case was evident. The revolutionary atmosphere enabled the im- 
plementation of quick, comprehensive and far-reaching reforms, which 
would enable the establishment of a fully fledged market economy. Ali 
encompassing political support for agonizing economic reforms was fa- 
cilitated by the fact that the communists were to blame. The aversion to 
the former regime created ‘political credit’ and offered the opportunity to 
apply a‘scorched-earth-policy’ [Balcerowicz, 1995],
The extent to which market reform and democratization coincide is 
a well-known topie in political economics. Friedrich August von Hayek 
saw the two as complementary, stating that a market economy is a pre- 
condition for a democratic society. Conseąuently, democracy was threat- 
ened by the persistence of a regulatory government. Joseph Alois Schum- 
peter, although also belonging to the Austrian school of thought, believed 
market and democracy were not complementary, but rather antithetical. 
He argued that, whereas markets are inherently characterized by winners 
and losers, democratic decision-making is always focused on a redistri- 
bution of realized gains. This undermines market incentives, which will 
be gradually replaced by governmental regulations. On the basis of these
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assumptions, Schumpeter formulated his theory of an inevitable evolu- 
tionary process from capitalism to communism [Schumpeter, 1942].
The complementarity of market reform and democratization in Central 
and Eastern Europę is supported by the differences observed during the 
transformation. A planned economy is characterized by the leading role 
of government in economic decision-making. Bargaining is pivotal, in 
particular for reformed communist regimes. With the demise of central 
planning in 1989, a process of ‘depoliticization’ materialized, smoothing 
the progress of market reforms [Bartlett, 1997].
In recent debates on the transition to a market economy, the focus has 
shifted to the possible constraints of democratization. Balcerowicz’s con- 
cept of ‘political credit’ stresses the temporary naturę of any large-scale 
political support from citizens. Many authors have put forward the idea 
that it is easier to implement market reform under authoritarian rule. 
It has been suggested that, as transition entailed a huge effect on the 
distribution of wealth, democratization might hamper economic reform 
[Offe, 1991; Przeworski, 1991]. In any case, the complementarity of de­
mocratization and market reform can only be predicted in cases where 
certain minimal welfare levels have been reached.
To many, the political dimension of the transition process entered the 
discussion in the form of new constraints. Two types of constraints can 
be distinguished: political constraints ex antę and ex post. Ex antę politi­
cal constraints determine the “achievability” of policy decisions, whereas 
ex post constraints are those that allow a decision to be annulled once its 
negative side effects emerge [Roland, 1994, 1997], The generał idea is that 
the optimal policy - shock treatment or gradualism - depends on the na­
turę of the constraints. Political constraints that precede decision-making 
regarding economic reforms make it advantageous to compromise or to 
temporarily postpone radical alternatives. In particular, a gradual transi­
tion became the most likely strategy in those countries with a heritage of 
‘enlightened’ communism, characterized by a relatively well-functioning 
system for the supply of consumer goods and by the presence of an op- 
position already tolerated and subseąuently represented along the lines 
of a party organization in parliament. In this respect, Hungary is often 
considered to be a good illustration [Roland, 1994].
Ex post political constraints reąuire a policy that hugely augments the 
costs that are incurred in undoing failed measures. This was the situa- 
tion directly after the turmoil of the revolutionary climate, in which mass 
movements, such as Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum in Czechoslo- 
vakia, guaranteed a collective rejection of communism. This rejection was 
not expressed in a political arena characterized by the parliamentary 
representation of ideas and interests by political parties [Roland, 1997].
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Despite the emphasis on political constraints in debates on transition, 
it is noteworthy that in Central and Eastern Europę these constraints 
have appeared to be in effect so far. Former communists have been able 
to return to the political arena in countries that joined the European 
Union (EU) in May 2004, but reforms have only rarely been overturned. 
In this sense, the return of former communists has not entailed a return 
to communism.
What does this imply for the Hayekian dilemma about the role of the 
State as the initiating organ of market reform and democratization? The 
developments in Central and Eastern Europę revealed a rediscovery of 
the market as an institution with a nexus of rules on competition and 
property rights, with a significant portion of GDP produced within the 
public sector and a tax system that enables the redistribution of the 
market allocation of wealth. Pure markets may or may not be reconcil- 
able with democracy, but the markets existing in Central and Eastern 
Europę have proven to be morę than just price mechanisms. The huge 
diversity in market regimes that have come into existence in Central and 
Eastern Europę is reflected in recent developments in theories regarding 
transition.
5. Path - dependent transitology
Liberał thinking, which suggests that markets facilitate democracy and 
freedom, set the stage at the beginning of transition. It is noteworthy 
that reform-minded democrats in Central and Eastern Europę sometimes 
went even further than the liberał extremes. They rejected the so-called 
‘third way’ as an inadeąuate alternative. Hungary’s reforms in the 1970s 
and 1980s had proven to be ineffective and this experience led to the 
conviction, even before institutional support came from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that a strictly liberał policy 
was not just the best but the only alternative [Bónker et al., 2002]. When 
analyzing the substance of this concept, it often appeared that some kind 
of nineteenth-century liberalism prevailed. There was strong support for 
these ideas from political economists in the region. It was not an acci- 
dent that the work of Hayek was translated and madę accessible in quite 
a number of relatively smali countries in Central and Eastern Europę.
The liberał model was believed to have generał validity. The idea 
that markets facilitate democracy applied to several countries in Latin 
America and was, therefore, ‘transferred’ to the transition countries in 
Central and Eastern Europę. However, this perception of the generał 
applicability of the liberał model had a negative impact upon regional
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studies. Whereas before 1989, regional specialists emphasized the inter- 
relation of historical, economic and sociocultural factors to explain the 
naturę of market performances in a specific region, after the demise of 
communism the generał validity of the liberał model of market func- 
tioning and market performance was taken for granted. With respect to 
theory formulating, it can be demonstrated that the demise of commu­
nism triggered the downfall of regional studies on Central and Eastern 
Europę.
Liberalism still dominates debates on transition, but it has lost its 
monopoly position. Three factors have led to the development of alter- 
native ideas which have challenged its domination. Firstly, economic 
crises in the second half of the 1990s played the role of a catalyst. After 
all, as mentioned above, the severity of this crisis surpassed the Great 
Depression in depth and length and has led some specialists in the field 
to have second thoughts. Some have even claimed that this crisis was 
‘state-made’ [Poznański, 2002], Most of the criticism, however, has fo- 
cused not so much on the techniąues of stabilization and liberalization 
measures, but on the disproportionate emphasis on these aspects of 
transition. The success of stabilization and liberalization was believed 
to be largely dependent on the extent to which markets function. As 
they were not functioning, it was concluded that the genuine task of 
transition had not been fulfilled and that the stabilization and liber­
alization measures taken had been unable to meet the reąuirements of 
this endeavour.
Secondly, in the mid 1990s, crises occurred that exposed the vulner- 
ability of markets in both Central and Eastern Europę. The ‘Asian Crisis’ 
started a new debate on the extent to which a country’s financial markets 
can become morę exposed to recession in a world that is characterized by 
‘globalization’. As can been seen in Table 1, the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis was felt severely in the Czech Republic (1997/98) and the Russian 
Federation (1998). On a morę moderate scalę, its effects were also seen 
in the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania (1997). In leading In­
ternational financial organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
the issue was debated intensely. In addition, structural adjustment pro- 
grammes that had been set up for a number of Latin American countries 
had shown ambiguous results, both in terms of real income growth and 
income distribution [Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 2000]. Due to the fact that 
these programmes were perceived as generally applicable and, there- 
fore, also appropriate to the transition countries in Central and Eastern 
Europę, the transition debates also shifted focus from a ‘Washington’ to 
a ‘Post-Washington consensus’. ‘Good governance’ became the leading 
thread in the discussions.
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Thirdly, there was growing disapproval of the negative conseąuences 
of large-scale privatization. At the beginning of transition, there was 
a narrow focus on a quick transfer of property rights from the State to 
the public. To that end, several methods of privatization were developed. 
These varied from the selling of shares via stock exchange markets, as 
was the case in Hungary, to a free division of state property amongst 
the generał population, as was the case with the system of voucher 
privatization by means of auctions, particularly in the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania and the Russian Federation. On the one hand, the experi- 
ences with privatization engendered discussion on the extent to which 
it accelerated the process of restructuring, while, on the other hand, 
there was broad-scale disapproval of the emergence of a new class of 
extremely rich owners who, due to the monopolistic structures of mar­
kets, were able to circumvent its disciplinary rules. The first aspect led 
to the view that quick privatization by no means guaranteed quick re­
structuring, the Czech Republic serving as an illustrative example. The 
emergence of a monopolistic, manoeuvring ‘nouveau riche’ in some cases 
even fuelled a discussion on the renationalization of property rights, as 
was the case in the Russian Federation. During transition it became 
elear that well-defined property rights were much morę important than 
private property as such. In cases where property rights were not well 
defined, there was a diffuse system in which a elear distinction between 
authority and responsibility was lacking. As a consequence, on the macro 
level the discussion developed into a debate on ‘good governance’, while 
on a micro level ‘corporate governance’ gained importance, something 
which, at the beginning of the 1990s, was not an issue at all. In fact, for 
a long time the idea prevailed that a decentralization of property rights 
was good in itself.
These three factors accompanied a revival of observations underlining 
the importance of the historical and sociocultural backgrounds of the 
transition countries. The analyses of the success of the Baltic states pro- 
vides an example. In these accounts, the accomplishments were no longer 
exclusively attributed to the policy applied, but were also attributed to 
the legacy of a Soviet past which created the massive political support 
needed for excruciatingly difficult economic reforms. A shift in the ex- 
planation of the relative success or failure of transition, from attributing 
it to current policy to regarding it as a legacy of the past, calls for an 
historical approach. At the beginning of the transition of these states, 
the idea was that divergent initial conditions such as reformed/non-re- 
formed, Soviet past/Central and Eastern Europę, large/small, et cetera, 
played a negligible role. However, sińce the second half of the 1990s, it 
has been stressed that these divergent initial conditions co-determined
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and could explain differences in the extent to which markets functioned. 
As a conseąuence, regional specialists re-entered the arena of research 
on transition.
At the same time, the market is now morę freąuently and morę explic- 
itly conceived of as an institution. The market as an institution reąuires 
the implementation of and commitment to rules. In this respect, the 
neo-classical justification for the creation of a market economy is highly 
problematic. In the neo-classical framework, the market is perceived of 
as an independent, smoothly functioning institution. Within the sub-dis- 
cipline of transitology, a shift towards the sociologically inspired work on 
‘second generation’ theories can be discerned. These theories focus, for 
example, on the emergence and importance of civil society and trust. An 
analysis of the significance and relevance of these elements for the suc- 
cess or failure of transition reąuires an interdisciplinary approach. Some 
have stressed that the shift in focus reveals a paradigm shift [Bónker et 
al., 2002] and there seems to be some truth in this claim. The controversy 
over shock-versus-gradualism has morę or less vanished, as this debate 
only highlighted a limited number of aspects, while transition is seen 
morę and morę to be a multi-level phenomenon within society. Transi­
tion entails much morę than a decentralization of the decision-making 
processes of governments.
6. Transition - the end?
This article opened with a description of the origin of transition 
theory following the collapse of communism. To conclude, it would 
be sensible to address the ąuestion ‘When is transition finished?’ As 
early as 1993, the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus proclaimed the 
completion of the transition process. However, within a few years the 
Czech Republic faced a crisis, the causes of which were to be found 
in an incomplete transition to a market economy. In 2001, after the 
publication of an optimistic EU report on the progress that the Hun- 
garians had madę with respect to entry conditions, the Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban also announced the end of a successful 
transition. Although Hungary has not faced a subseąuent decline in 
economic activity, the country has faced great difficulties in its at- 
tempt to prepare for the implementation of the Euro after accession. 
Although Orban’s claim has been not belied, its correctness has not 
been confirmed either.
Meanwhile, various authors have addressed the criteria which indicate 
the end of transition [Brown, 1999], For some, these criteria are based
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on pragmatic considerations, such as accession to the EU. Indeed, many 
citizens in Central and Eastern Europę have perceived EU accession as 
the ultimate proof of the end of transition. The transition to a market 
economy was considered complete with a return to Europę, a journey from 
the periphery to the centre. However, the EU is a mixed group of hetero- 
geneous countries. While they all feel committed to democratic order and 
the market economy, the task of finding appropriate criteria determining 
the end of the transition process still remains.
The end of transition can also be perceived from a point of view that 
focuses on performance. To what extent, for example, do growth figures 
converge to those of highly developed countries in the West? Currently, 
economic growth in transition countries is higher than in the EU, but 
differences in welfare remain enormous. Even the most affluent transi­
tion country, Slovenia, whose GDP is 75 per cent of the EU average, will 
need a generation to catch up with Western economies. Furthermore, the 
ąuestion remains as to whether economic performance can offer a decisive 
criterion for determining the end of a transition process. Market econo­
mies may suffer from recessions, whereas planned economies are able to 
sustain production during global recessionary economic declines. Rather 
than assuming that transition started with the collapse of a specific type 
of socialism - a system of a planned economic order - it seems morę ap­
propriate to use systemie devices to evaluate the extent to which transi­
tion has finished or not. Despite great variations in the original systems 
in Central and Eastern European countries, one theme is common to their 
transitions, supply constraints have been substituted with demand-con- 
trol. Some have proposed not to focus on the characteristics of the system 
at the desired endpoint, but rather on specific phenomena of the systemie 
transition, such as disproportionate rent-seeking [Aslund, 2002].
It may be taken for granted that a market economy is, or is conceived 
of as being, superior to a planned economy. However, the path from 
a centrally planned economy to a market economy by no means implies 
a Pareto improvement. Therefore, transitology was able to establish itself 
as a new sub-discipline of social economies, with its foundation due to 
a successful demarcation of the research subject rather than a straight- 
forward methodology.
The huge number of different modes of market regimes that have 
emerged in Central and Eastern Europę are fodder for social economists. 
In studying these differences, it is less important to depict the strategies 
and the outeomes than to explain them. Therefore, the end of transition 
is not the end of transitology.
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